We examine the incentives for non-consolidating mergers in commercial media industries. In a model with differentiated media and products, it is shown that such a merger can be profitable since it gives merging media firms a bargaining advantage vis-à-vis advertisers in the negotiations for advertising space. The extent to which this bargaining advantage yields profitable conditions for a merger depends on the extent of competition for audiences among media firms. In particular, higher levels of competition make media mergers more profitable. This result is in contrast to that implied by oligopoly models for traditional product markets, which suggest that mergers become less profitable for higher levels of competition.
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On the Profitability of Media Mergers
Introduction
Deregulation of ownership in media industries, as initiated with the 1996
Telecommunications Act, has induced a series of mergers in both radio and television.
For example, the U.S. television industry recently saw two large-scale mergers formed by CBS and Viacom in 1999 and AOL and Time Warner in 2000 . In the radio industry, Clear Channel Communications has merged over 1200 radio stations nationwide. These mergers have already altered the competition for advertising space, as control over program provision and distribution has been consolidated. In this paper, we investigate possible incentives for these mergers and suggest under what market conditions media mergers are profitable.
Oligopoly models used to analyze horizontal mergers in most industries do not necessarily apply to the commercial media industry. Existing oligopoly models assume that firms face one set of customers, as opposed to commercial media firms, which face two sets of customers: subscribers (e.g. listeners or viewers) and advertisers.
Consequently, media firms considering a merger must evaluate the merger's effect on their competitive standing with regard to the sale of advertising, which crucially depends on the post-merger choices of subscribers. And because we model subscribers' choices in media markets as well as their resultant product choices, we are able to capture the costs and benefits of media mergers that are left out of existing merger analyses. We find, in fact, that the incentives for media mergers are not necessarily implied by existing oligopoly models. First we show that even in a model of Bertrand competition in product markets, media mergers may be unprofitable. Moreover, in traditional oligopoly models a merger between two parties is more likely to be advantageous the larger the size of the merged entity in comparison to the size of the entire market, as measured by its number of participants (see Deneckere & Davidson (1985) ,) whereas in media markets, the opposite may be the case. Specifically, we show that incentives for media mergers actually improve when the relative size of the merged entity declines.
The link between media competition and the profitability of media mergers depends crucially on the media's relationship between subscribers and advertisers. In our 3 more than 20 terrestrial channels. Similarly, in radio, satellite and Internet radio provide many more options than traditional radio broadcasts.
The increase in competition in these media industries has strengthened the incentives for television and radio mergers by ensuring that any bargaining advantage vis-à-vis advertisers attributed to the merged party outweighs the alleviated competition effect. Relaxation of regulatory constraints, via the 1996 Telecommunications Act and laissez faire leadership in the FCC, have enabled media firms to act on these incentives. 2 Our result is a notable contrast to common notions about mergers in oligopoly.
For example, in Deneckere & Davidson's (1985) analysis of Bertrand competitors, higher degrees of competition lower the incentive for mergers. In their model, the strategic complementarity of prices implies the existence of a positive externality, which is internalized through a merger. When the degree of competition is higher (with more firms, for example), the portion of this external benefit that the merger can internalize is smaller.
It is not, however, the issue of strategic complementarity that drives our distinctive result. Advertising choices in our model are, in fact, strategic complements, which follows from the fact that listeners are averse to advertising: more advertising on one station allows competing stations to broadcast more advertisements as well. The distinction from the Bertrand analysis is that increases in advertising on one station imposes a negative externality on competing stations since more advertising by a station ultimately lowers producers' payments for advertising. As a result, more competition in the media industry reduces the portion of the external cost that stations internalize when merging.
An important factor for our contrasting result is that mergers in the media market are strategically related to the decisions in the product market. Prior to our work, Tyagi (1999) and Chipty & Snyder (1999) have recognized that the common intuition about horizontal mergers might not hold when one considers the reaction of upstream agents.
However, these works focus on vertical market structures: suppliers -retailers -4 consumers. The present work, on the other hand, concerns a circular relationship among agents: producers -stations -consumers -producers.
It has also been recognized in previous work that the media industry is unique relative to traditional product industries. For example, Steiner (1952) , Beebe (1977) , and Spence & Owen (1977) are seminal papers that examine market provision of programming when media compete for viewers in order to attract advertisers. More recently Masson et al (1990) , Gabszewicz et al (2001) , Anderson & Coate (2003) more formally investigate programming and advertising decisions under various industry conditions. However, the investigation for the incentive for mergers is not examined by the above papers.
Empirical studies of media, such as Schmalensee et al (1983) , which examines the costs of advertising allocation across media, Niak et al (1998) , which suggests optimal media schedules of advertising with respect to advertising effectiveness, and Siddarth & Chattopadhyay (1998) , which examines dynamic consumer choice when exposed to television advertising were not intended to offer guidance for understanding media mergers.
Another distinction of our work from previous studies is that we explicitly model consumer choice in the product market. By doing so, we are able to capture more of the economic forces in the market for advertising space since any benefit from advertising ultimately comes from consumers' product choices. The absence of an explicit product market in previous papers limits the possibility to extend previous theoretical frameworks to examine the incentive for mergers.
To examine media mergers, we modify a model developed in . As in , we use Nash bargaining to model the exchange for advertising between stations and producers. By doing so, we are able to capture a station's change in negotiating position vis-à-vis producers as a result of a merger. It is the improvement of the negotiating position of the merged entity that can yield profits for the merging stations. 3 In our analysis, we restrict attention to non-consolidating mergers, which do not reduce the number of active stations post-merger. Specifically, in a merger between two stations, the merged entity continues to operate both stations in their pre-merger locations. The only consequence of the merger is to transform the two stations into a single, unified agent in negotiations with producers. We focus on non-consolidating mergers for two reasons. First, a consolidating merger reduces the number of active stations post-merger. As a result, the merged entity as well as its competitors may gain negotiating power vis-à-vis advertisers simply because the overall number of competitors in the media market is smaller. Studying the post-merger model of a consolidating merger between two stations is equivalent, therefore, to evaluating the pre-merger scenario with one less station. Second, evidence from U.S. media industries suggests that horizontal media mergers are of the non-consolidating type.
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Our model is developed in the next section. The pre-merger analysis is presented in section 3 and the post-merger analysis is in section 4. Concluding remarks are contained in section 5. Proofs of all propositions are contained in Appendix A.
The Model
Consider a commercial media market that consists of an even number of stations, each offering differentiated programs to listeners and a product market that consists of two competing brands. 5 The preferences of the consumers among the stations and the products are described by a locational model as illustrated in Figure 1 .
The consumers are uniformly distributed on a circle of one unit length, with their preferences among stations determined independent of their preferences between products. 6 Stations and products are positioned at equal distance from each other on the distribution of preferences in the media and product markets, respectively. The address of 4 The events discussed in the opening paragraph, for example, all involved non-consolidating mergers. 5 The model can be easily extended to allow for more than two competing brands without affecting any of our comparative statics results. 6 It is conceivable to consider a model in which preferences are correlated across markets. This would allow producers to target their advertising message to consumers who are more inclined to buy their products. Our setting focuses on describing competition among the producers in the same industry. For example, consumers who choose view to NBC instead of ABC are not necessarily those who prefer Coke over Pepsi or GM over Ford cars. As such, caution should be used when applying our results to settings where brand images are closely related to station format.
6 the consumer in the two distributions is designated by x for the media market and by y for the product market. ϕ the number of advertising messages producer i chooses to place with station j . This level of advertising determines the probability that the listeners of station j become aware of the existence of product i . This outreach probability is designated by ) (
. Hence, the outreach probability increases with the number of commercials pertaining to product i that are aired by station j . Our model considers informative advertising, where messages inform the viewer of the exis tence of a particular brand, non-price attributes (i.e. its location on the circle), and its price.
8
The utility that a given consumer derives from listening to a certain station depends upon the overall level of advertising messages that this station chooses to put on the air as well as the location of the consumer on the distribution of preferences between the n stations. We designate by j Φ the aggregate level of advertising of station j (namely,
) and specify the functional relationship between the listener's utility and the aggregate level of advertising of the station as follows:
where x is the distance of the listener from station j , and ) (x U j designates the net utility when listening to this station. The above payoff function captures the combined disutility imposed on the consumer due to her inability to find a perfect mix of programs to match her preferences as well as the nuisance costs imposed by advertising. 9 The parameter γ measures the nuisance cost per advertising message that is imposed on the consumer.
The specification in (1) implies tha t consumers are informed of the aggregate level of advertising of the different stations before deciding on their listening behavior.
The idea is that stations establish a certain reputation for how often their programs are 8 Our modeling of informative advertising was first proposed in Butters (1977) and extended to differentiated products in Grossman & Shapiro (1984) . See also Gabszewicz & Garella (1986). 9 Since consumers derive possible benefits from the information contained in advertising messages, it may be suggested that it enters to some extent, positively in (1). However, our formulation implies that after all informational content has been extracted from advertising it is considered a nuisance. Furthermore, in our earlier work we have demonstrated that even if consumers initially derive benefits from advertising, stations will always offer levels of advertising in the region where it is considered a nuisance by consumers (see 11 Ad caps or other ext ernally imposed advertising constraints, when binding, will affect our bargaining result. We have set up a model with the U.S. broadcast media in mind and since it appears that such constraints are the exception, we do not consider them here. A deeper investigation into this area would be worthwhile given such advertising restrictions are more common in European media industries. We offer speculation on this issue in the Conclusion. 12 To model the negotiations between a given producer-station pair we utilize the Nash bargaining solution. This cooperative solution concept implies that the parties to the negotiation agree to split evenly the surplus generated in the trade between them. With a two part tariff pricing scheme, multiple combinations of fixed and variable charges may be consistent with the single Nash bargaining solution that governs the negotiations between a given producer-station pair. However, in all of those different combinations the total payment received from the producer is identical and equal to the payment collected with linear pricing. Essentially, the total payment guarantees the station half of the gains from trade generated in the negotiations between the parties. 9 advertising agencies and not the TV or radio stations that broadcast those messages. The production cost of each product producer consists of a per-unit variable cost, c , and fixed cost p f . We designate by i p the price of brand i as selected by this product producer.
Our main objective in the present paper is to evaluate the effect of horizontal mergers between stations on the negotiating position of the merged entity. We demonstrate, in particular, that the degree of competitiveness of the media market, as measured by s t and n and the nuisance parameter γ play a key role in determining the profitability of the merger. Our main result tends to contradict, however, the conventional wisdom concerning horizontal mergers in regular product markets. In product markets, with competition in prices (Bertrand equilibrium) horizontal mergers are unambiguously profitable, and the profitability of the mergers is enhanced the more concentrated and less competitive the market is. In contrast, we find that a merger between stations in the media market may actually be unprofitable since it leads to a deteriorated negotiating position of the merged entity. Moreover, the likelihood of a profitable merger is actually enhanced when the media market is more competitive (bigger n and smaller s t values).
We model the game as consisting of three stages. In the first stage, two competing stations decide on whether to merge their operatio ns. Given our focus on the effect of the merger on the negotiating position of the merged entity we only consider nonconsolidating mergers, whereby the merged entity continues to operate both stations postmerger. If the merging parties were to consolidate their operation, by closing for instance one station then the merger would reduce the number of active participants in the media market. It would be difficult to determine, therefore, whether it is the decline in the number of active stations or the sheer collaboration between the merging parties that affects the negotiating position of the merged entity.
In the second stage of the game, negotiations between stations and producers take place. If two competing stations decide to merge in the first stage they negotiate with producers as a unified entity as illustrated in Figure 2 . The pairwise negotiations among station j and brand producer i determine the price for placing advertising messages, Even though we model the negotiations in the second stage of the game as taking place simultaneously with the pricing and advertising decisions of the producers, the analysis can be easily extended to allow for sequential move in this stage of the game, with prices and advertising levels chosen subsequent to the negotiations. In particular, if the outcome of the negotiations between any pair of negotiators remains unobservable to other participants in the market, the results of the analysis remain unaffected with sequential move. As well, it is not unreasonable to assume that producers decide on their advertising simultaneously with the signing of the advertising agreement with the station, since often such agreements specify both the cost and the number of messages to be conveyed by the station. 13 It is possible to extend our game formulation to the case where stations and producers bargain over advertising levels in addition to the price of adverting space. (See .) Such a formulation removes the internal marginal cost of advertising to the producer, in terms of per unit advertising payments, and yields more advertising and lower profits to all parties in equilibrium. It can be shown that if given the choice of the bargaining contract terms, say in stage 0 of the our model, agents would choose in equilibrium to bargain over price only. 14 As was pointed out earlier, stations establish a certain reputation for their aggregate advertising levels. Consumers use this publicly available information to decide on their listening behavior.
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To model the negotiations between a given pair of negotiators we utilize the Nash bargaining solution. This cooperative solution concept implies that the parties to the negotiation agree to split evenly the surplus generated in the trade between them. In the negotiation between the merged entity and brand producer i , let m C and i F designate the payoffs that accrue to the merged entity and producer bargaining games à la Rubinstein (1982) for instance, converges to the Nash bargaining solution as the probability that negotiations break down tends to zero (see, for instance, Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, p.310) . Hence utilizing this solution concept implements the same outcome that would have obtained by modeling the negotiations explicitly as a sequence of offers and counter-offers between a given station-producer pair.
It is noteworthy that our model can be easily extended to incorporate multiple product markets without changing any of our results. As long as stations do not face binding capacity constraints on the number of slots that can be made available to advertisers, the relative negotiating position of a station vis-à-vis given producer depends only on the characteristics of the media market and the product market in which this producer operates. The structure of other, unrelated product markets has no effect whatsoever on the negotiations. Specifically, the added gains from trade between station j and producer i , as measured by ) (
and
, are independent of the structure of product markets unrelated to the one in which i operates. When stations do face binding capacity constraints, the extension to multiple product markets is more complicated since the allocation of the limited capacity across different product markets is bound to depend on the relative profitability of the different markets. In the present paper, we restrict attention, therefore, to a media market that faces excess capacity in terms of the availability of advertising slots.
To derive the agreement and disagreement payoffs of the negotiations we first identify the segment of the market that is covered by each station and product producer as a function of the number of media messages aired by the stations and the prices paid by consumers. Using the utility specification (1), we can obtain the market share of station j as implied by the advertising decisions of the producers as follows:
where stations 1 + j and 1 − j designate the immediate neighbors of station j on the circle. Note that the market share of station j declines as its neighbors cut back on their aggregate levels of advertising and as the station increases its own level of advertising.
The derivation of the market share of product producer i is complicated by the fact that consumers become informed of the different brands available in the product market probabilistically. The expected share of station j 's viewers who end up purchasing brand i in the product market can be expressed as follows:
The first term of (3) corresponds to i 's expected share if a given consumer is informed only about i 's product and not about that of its competitor. The second term corresponds to i 's expected share when the consumer is familiar with both products. In the latter case, the consumer compares the prices of the two products and contingent upon those prices and her location on the distribution of preferences chooses the brand that offers her the higher net utility. This comparison yields the expected market share expressed by the second term of (3). Note that similar to Grossman & Shapiro (1984) , a consumer in our model may end up buying her least preferred brand if she is familiar only with this brand. The consumers represented by the first term of (3) purchase brand i irrespective of their location on the distribution of preferences between the two brands.
The underlying assumption is that the prices of the products are sufficiently low so that the consumer's willingness to pay for the product, p v , exceeds the cost she incurs (product price and transportation cost) irrespective of her location on the line.
No-Merger Equilibrium
We start by deriving the equilibrium of the second stage assuming that no pair of stations has merged. Using the expressions for the market shares we can now state the agreement and disagreement payoffs relevant to the negotiations between station j and producer i as follows: 
where,
Notice that upon disagreement between station j and producer i the market shares of the immediate neighboring stations of j (i.e. 1 − j and 1 + j ) decline, 15 since those stations advertise more intensely than their neighbor, station j .
Utilizing (4) and (5), one can derive the added benefit that each party obtains from the negotiations as follows:
At the Nash bargaining solution the negotia ted rate j i a maximizes the product ) )( (
, implying that the parties split evenly the surplus generated in the negotiations so that ) ( ) (
The producers choose their level of advertising with the stations and their prices simultaneously with the negotiations, implying that they consider the negotiated rate 
It is easy to show that second order conditions to guarantee the existence of a unique interior solution to (8) and (9) hold as long as the outreach probability function is not "too convex." In particular, if ) (⋅ G is a concave function, second order conditions hold.
Since all stations and producers face identical advertising and production technologies, respectively, and since the distribution of consumer preferences is uniform, the solution to (7)- (8) is symmetric. At the symmetric equilibrium, each producer diversifies its advertising intensity equally across stations and each station charges producers identical prices. Our analysis can be easily extended to allow for asymmetries between stations and producers. For instance, if the consumers' distribution of preferences over stations is skewed in favor of one station, at the equilibrium producers will naturally not allocate their advertising effort equally across stations anymore. We focus on symmetry since our main objective in the present paper is to evaluate the consequences of horizontal mergers among stations that are a-priori identical.
In Lemma 1 we impose additional restrictions on the parameters of the model to guarantee that producers select positive levels of advertising and that stability of advertising and pricing reaction functions is guaranteed. 16 Even though the expression for the total payment to station j in (7) depends upon the levels of advertising and the price chosen by producer i, this producer does not attempt to manipulate the negotiated payment when choosing its level of advertising and its price. The fact that the choice of the decision variables j i ϕ and i p is simultaneous with the negotiations guarantees that to be the case. 17 If producers were maximizing market shares, instead of profits, then price competition would be more aggressive and would lead to marginal cost pricing by producers, thereby eliminating any benefit of product differentiation as measured by p t .
Lemma 1
Let,
(i) Each producer chooses positive levels of advertising if 0 ) ( > ϕ T .
(ii) Reaction function stability is guaranteed if 0
The function ) (⋅ T defined in Lemma 1 represents a measure of the marginal contribution of advertising to the producer net of its negotiated payment to the station.
The gross marginal contribution of advertising is measured by ) (ϕ G′ . However, at the Nash bargaining solution, any surplus generated in the negotiations must be shared equally between the producer and the station. In particular, the added surplus to G has to be split evenly between the parties, translating to an increased negotiated rate of
, the net marginal contribution of advertising is negative even though the gross marginal contribution is positive (since
). As a result, producers will not find it profitable to advertise at all at the symmetric equilibrium. The requirement that 0 ) ( > ϕ T is equivalent to the statement that the elasticity of the outreach probability function ) (⋅ G exceeds ½.
The condition stated in part (ii) of the lemma guarantees that the net marginal contribution of advertising to a given producer declines if both producers increase their advertising symmetrically. Specifically, when producers increase their advertising both the gross marginal benefit from advertising and the negotiated rate with each station may decline. The stability condition 0 ) ( < ′ ϕ T guarantees that the former effect dominates, so that higher levels of advertising by both producers reduce the marginal contribution to a larger extent than the reduction in the negotiated payments.
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Consider, for instance, the example that (ii), namely stability is guaranteed whenever the net marginal contribution of advertising is positive.
With the restrictions imposed in Lemma 1 we are now ready to characterize the second stage equilibrium assuming that no stations have merged in the first stage.
Proposition 1
At the equilibrium each producer chooses identical intensities of advertising with the stations. This intensity per station is expressed by
The symmetric product price selected at the equilibrium is expressed by
The payoffs of each station and each producer are expressed, respectively, as follows:
According to Proposition 1, the intensity of advertising per station is higher the less competitive the media market is, as reflected by higher degrees of differentiation and a smaller number of competing stations (bigger s t and smaller n values). As well, advertising per station increases the smaller the nuisance cost of advertising that is imposed on consumers (smaller values of γ ). A less competitive media market implies that each producer has more to gain from advertising with a given station, since its viewers tend to be more loyal to the programs offered by this station. When the nuisance cost of advertising declines, consumers are not particularly annoyed by the interruptions to programming that commercials cause. As a result, producers find it advantageous to advertise more aggressively. This corresponds, perhaps, with efforts by advertising agencies to make advertising more entertaining.
Higher levels of advertising yield more intense competition in prices between the product producers, as consumers become better informed about the options available in the market. In (11), therefore, intensified advertising reduces the profit margin, c p − , that accrues to each producer. The effect of increased advertising on the joint profits of the stations (from equation (12)) is ambiguous, however. On the positive side, enhanced advertising per station improves the bargaining position of each station vis-à-vis the producers, thus permitting the station to secure better terms in the negotiations. As was explained earlier, the outside option of each producer is less favorable if, upon disagreement with a given station, the market share of this station improves significantly.
High levels of advertising at the equilibrium have indeed this effect, since disagreement yields a significant decline in the number of commercials carried by this station, thus attracting many more viewers from the competing stations. Intensified advertising has also a nega tive effect on the profits of the stations since price competition in the product market is more intense when consumers are better informed. The total available surplus that can be shared between the stations and producers shrinks as a result of such intensified price competition. The above-discussed ambiguity implies that changes in the parameters of the model (i.e. changes in the ratio [ ] s t n / γ ) have ambiguous effects on the joint profits of stations.
In Corollary 1 we derive a sufficient condition to resolve the ambiguity raised in Proposition 1 concerning the effect advertising levels have on the joint profits of stations.
Imposing this additional condition guarantees that the profitability of the media market declines when producers advertise more aggressively at the equilibrium.
Corollary 1
If the elasticity of the outreach probability ) (ϕ G is non-increasing, joint profits of the media stations decline if producers advertise more aggressively at the equilibrium.
Hence, the profitability of the media market declines if this market is less competitive Note that the result reported in Corollary 1 contradicts the conventional wisdom that intensified competition in a certain market reduces industry profits. Corollary 1 states that in media markets the opposite may actually be the case. This point is crucial to understanding the limited benefit to merging stations.
Relaxed competition in the media market implies that the rate at which listeners switch stations is lower. This encourages producers to advertise more, at the margin, since few listeners escape their advertising message. Consequently, there are higher levels of information available to consumers, which induces fiercer price competition for products. Media stations may be harmed, as a result, since their industry profits are determined as a fraction of product market's profits.
In the next section we explore the implication of Corollary 1 on the profitability of media mergers. Since a horizontal merger between two competing stations has the effect of reducing competition for listeners, the corollary suggests that industry surpluses will decline post merger. We show that there are conditions under which the merged pair 20 of stations gains a relative bargaining advantage for advertising payments, so that their profits increase while profits of their non-merged rivals falls.
Post-Merger Equilibria
An immediate implication of Corollary 1 is that consolidating merger are always unprofitable since it has the effect of reducing the number of stations to 1 − n . Therefore, in this section we only consider non-consolidated mergers, whereby the two merging stations continue to operate both stations post-merger. Given that the two merging stations can negotiate as a unified entity with producers, the main effect of a merger is to potentially change the relative negotiating position of the merged entity vis-à-vis producers. In the sequel we show that the consequences of a merger are dramatically different contingent upon whether or not the two merging stations are located next to each other on the circle. Figure 3 illustrates the distinction between these two different types of mergers. It is interesting that our results indicate that a merger does not necessarily enhance the negotiating position of the merged entity. If the merger is between two nonneighboring stations it has no effect on the negotiating position of the merged entity and if the merger is between two neighboring stations it can actually lead to a deteriorated negotiating position of the merged entity. In Proposition 2, we characterize the postmerger equilibrium when the merger is between two non-neighbors, and in Proposition 3
we do the same for a merger between neighboring stations.
Proposition 2
Assuming symmetry between the two merging parties, a merger between two nonneighboring stations yields an equilibrium that is identical to the no-merger equilibrium described in Proposition 1.
To characterize the post-merger equilibrium of two neighboring stations we utilize the notation illustrated in 
) (
(ii) The profits of the merged entity are:
where the price margin ) ( c p − is given by
and the levels of advertising are as specified in part (i).
The equations included in (14) indicate that levels of advertising on different stations are not necessarily the same post-merger. Specifically, when 2 > n , the level of advertising on a given station is determined by its proximity to the merged entity, implying that each pair of stations that is equally distanced from the merged entity adve rtises at the same intensity. The equations in (15) express the market shares of stations as a function of their proximity to the merged entity. The share of a given station's audience who end up buying a certain brand of the product is expressed in (16).
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The expression is, once again, contingent upon the proximity of the station to the merged entity. In the following proposition, we use the expressions obtained in Proposition 3 to characterize the properties of the post-merger equilibrium (between two neighboring stations).
Proposition 4
If the media market consists of more than two stations ( 2 > n ), a merger between two neighboring stations yields the following characterization.
(ii) If the elasticity of the outreach probability ) (⋅ G is non-increasing with the level of The characterization in Proposition 4 is related to the effect a non-consolidated merger has on the negotiated position of the merged entity. To understand this effect, consider first the case that 2 = n . According to Proposition 3, a merger between the stations in this case, results in a significant increase in the level of advertising per station.
In fact, each producer finds it advantageous to increase advertising to the highest level that is technically feasible. Advertising levels are higher since each producer is able to secure more favorable terms in the negotiations with the stations, implying that when the stations act in unison following the merger, their negotiating position, vis-à-vis the producers, deteriorates. Recall that when the two stations operate independently and one is unable to reach an agreement with a producer, the market share of this station rises in comparison to its share upon agreement. In view of the fact that consumers dislike the interruptions caused by commercials, they switch to the station that reduces its intensity of advertising when being unable to reach an agreement. Since disagreement confers an advantage on the stations, each is able to secure favorable terms when operating independently. This advantage disappears, however, when the stations merge and act in unison. When the merged entity is unable to reach an agreement with a producer, aggregate levels of advertising on each station decline. However, such a decline does not necessarily benefit the merged entity anymore. Even if one station benefits from a larger market share upon disagreement (if advertising levels are not identical across stations) the remaining station must necessarily lose market share. Given that the merged entity owns both stations and cares, therefore, about their joint payoffs, its "outside option" is not as favorable as it would be if each station continued to operate independently.
When the number of stations that participate in the media market is greater than two the implications of a merger are not as extreme as when 2 = n . In a merger between non-neighboring stations, levels of advertising remain unaffected since the negotiated price of advertising remains the same pre-and post-merger. In a merger between neighboring stations, levels of advertising post-merger exceed the levels pre-merger, but according to Proposition 4, those levels fall short of the maximally feasible level of max ϕ .
As in the case of 2 = n , the higher levels of advertising are the result of lower prices for advertising that producers are able to secure, reflecting, once again, the possible deterioration of the negotiating position of the merged entity. To understand the latter result, note that in the absence of a merger, a disagreement between an independent station and a given producer reduces the market shares of the two neighboring stations of the disagreeing station. Two independent stations have, therefore, a "combined threat" of reducing the market shares of four competing stations with which a producer can continue to advertise in case of disagreement. When two non-neighboring stations merge their "combined threat" remains unaffected, as illustrated in Figure 5a . The four stations designated by ). This logic can explain levels of advertising on stations that are farther removed from the merged entity. Since a station that is located farther away is not considered a close substitute to the merged entity its negotiating position vis-à-vis producers is not as directly affected as that of a station that is located closer to the merged entity. As a result, it can negotiate higher prices, which encourages producers to cut back on their level of advertising.
To evaluate the effect of the merger on the combined payoff of the merged entity we compare the post-merger payoffs as expressed by (17) and (18) to the payoff of the two independent stations pre-merger as obtained from (12).
The comparison yields the results reported in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5
(i) When 2 = n , a merger between the stations is unambiguously disadvantageous since it reduces the joint profits of the merging stations.
(ii) When 2 > n , (a) a merger between two non-neighboring stations does not affect their joint payoff. A merger between two neighboring stations has an ambiguous effect on the joint payoff of the merging stations.
, a merger between two neighbors is unprofitable for small values of n and γ and large values of s t . A merger can be profitable, however, in the opposite case that n and γ are sufficiently large and s t is sufficiently small.
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To understand the implications of a merger between two stations on the joint payoff of the merging parties recall the effect a merger has on the overall level of advertising. From Proposition 3, a merger between two neighboring stations results in intensified advertising by the producers. Higher levels of advertising yield, in turn, intensified price competition in the product market since consumers become better informed about the options that are open to them in the product market. Since the payoff of the stations in the media market is determined as a fraction of the producer surplus generated in the market, the merging stations may be worse off when producers compete more aggressively in prices. Hence a merger between two neighboring stations may be counter-productive given that it leads to greater price competition in the product market.
When the media market is a duopoly, part (i) of the proposition asserts, indeed, that a merger is unambiguously disadvantageous due to the shrinking of the producer surplus that is implied by the merger. When the media market consists of more than two stations, a merger introduces an additional dimension that is absent in a market that consists only of two stations. Specifically, a merger results in differing levels of advertising across stations. While all stations increase the number of commercials they carry they do it in an asymmetric manner, with the merging stations advertising the most in comparison to their competitors. The merger has, therefore, two counteracting effects on the joint profits of the merging stations. On the negative side, the merger still leads to intensified price competition between producers due to the improved information that is available to consumers. 19 On the positive side, however, the asymmetry in advertising levels postmerger confers an advantage on the merging stations, since those stations can guarantee the producers that a larger fraction of their listeners will end up purchasing their products
With a better outreach to consumers than competitors the merging stations may enhance their appeal to the producers. The role of this asymmetry is reflected in the expression obtained for the joint profits of the merging stations in (18).
Consider the multiplicative term
. While the decline in the 19 It should be pointed out that a merged pair of stations might possibly alleviate product market competition by offering exclusive contracts on each station, one station each to the two producers. This would to tend to improve the benefit of a merger. The authors acknowledge Ginger Jin for this observation. See also for an analysis of exclusivity contracts in advertising. For the specific example considered in (ii)-(b) of Proposition 5, we show that a merger continues to be disadvantageous as long as the media market is not highly competitive (small n and large s t ) or consumers are not extremely averse to advertising (small γ ). In the opposite case, when the media market is highly competitive or when consumers have a strong aversion to advertising a merger between two neighboring stations can enhance their joint profits. The numerical calculations in Table 1 29 asymmetry among stations that can reverse the negative consequences of the merger on the producer surplus generated in the product market. Note also that a merger is less likely to be profitable, the higher are the selected levels of advertising pre-merger (small n , big s t , small γ , and large η ). Hence, if producers advertise intensely, even in the absence of a merger, the further increase in their advertising levels as a result of the merger implies that the latter is unambiguously unprofitable.
The results expressed in Table 1 for the specific example
contradict, as before, the implications of horizontal mergers in regular product markets.
In a differentiated oligopoly model where producers compete in prices, a nonconsolidated merger of two neighboring producers is unambiguously beneficial to the merging parties. Moreover, the benefit from the merger is larger, both in absolute and relative terms, the less competitive the product market is (see Appendix B). The latter result is the exact opposite of the comparative statics derived in Table 1 
Conclusion
We have modeled a commercial media oligopoly to analyze the incentives for horizontal media mergers. Such an analysis was not possible using traditional oligopoly theories because of a unique feature of this industry involving the relationship between listeners' choices in the media market and their consequent product choices as a result of advertising. The adapted model (from permitted our merger analysis to account for modifications in listeners', as well as, advertisers' choices as a result of a merger.
The complexity of the equilibrium expressions in this three-stage model prohibits us from deriving specific ranges of the parameter space that characterize a profitable merger. Numerical results for a specified "outreach probability" function, however,
suggest parameter values for which a merger is profitable.
Our analysis illustrates the following trade-off faced by two stations considering a merger. On one hand, merging stations can benefit by gaining a bargaining advantage vis-à-vis producers in the negotiations for advertising space. This advantage is a result of the ability of the merger to offer producers more listeners than competing stations can.
On the other hand, this advantage comes at the cost of yielding higher equilibrium levels of advertising. Higher levels of advertising stiffen price competition in product markets, which erodes producers' ability to pay for advertising space, ultimately undermining stations' profits.
We related this trade-off to the extent of competition in the media industry, as measured either by the number of competitors or the degree of differentiation among stations in order to derive conditions under which a media merger can be profitable. In particular, our analysis shows that for sufficiently high degrees of media competition, the merger's benefit, as a result of its bargaining advantage vis-à-vis producers, exceeds the losses associated with higher advertising levels. Intuitively stated, a merged pair of stations generates relatively more revenue for producers, which entitles it to a larger share of the negotiated surplus, while competition among the non-merged rival stations works to keep overall advertising levels in check.
To illustrate this intuition, consider the recent wave of consolidation in the radio industry. Over the past several years, Clear Channel Communications has built its bargaining adva ntage vis-à-vis advertisers through an acquisition of ove r 1200 radio stations while new competition from Internet and satellite radio has kept advertising levels in check and surpluses from the sale of consumer products from eroding too far.
While we have identified a trade-off associated with horizontal mergers in the media industry, it must be noted that there are other costs and benefits facing merging stations, such as economies of scale, scope, or other competitive advantages, which are not identified in our analysis. Nevertheless, our model should be viewed as illustrating an incentive for mergers, which has not been captured by traditional oligopoly models.
Finally, given the existence of capacity constraints on advertising in certain media markets, we offer speculation on the implications of these for our results. If such constraints were binding (or close to binding) in a pre-merger equilibrium, then advertising levels, post merger, would be constrained and, hence, lower than without the constraints. The adverse effect of intensified advertising would be less detrimental as a result. This intuition suggests, therefore, that the net benefit of a merger is improved as a result of the advertising constraints. To guarantee reaction function stability, the following matrix must be negative definite:
Using the above expressions we obtain that 
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider first the case that there are at least two independent stations in between the two merging stations. In the negotiations between the merged entity and producer i the following agreement and disagreement payoffs apply. 
In the negotiations between an independent station j and producer i , equation (7) 
The unique solution to system (A.4) is In the negotiations between an independent station j and producer i the following agreement and disagreement payoffs remain as in (4) and (5) It is easy to show that 2 0 / 2 n t > Π in both cases. Hence the merger is unambiguously profitable to the merging parties. Moreover, the benefit from the merger is larger both in absolute and in relative terms for 4 = n than for 6 = n . This conclusion can be generalized for bigger values of n , as well. See Table B .1. Notice also that for a given n , the benefit increases with the differentiation parameter t . When 2 = n , a merger between the two brands allows them to extract the entire surplus of the "critical consumer" who is indifferent between the two brands. Specifically, ). Hence, the benefit from the merger is greatest in a duopoly market and it declines as the number of competitors increases.
